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so forth." 
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Educational Implications 
Based on a Study of the Method of Analysis · 
Herbert ~- Clugston 
. Analysis forms an integral part of any complete act of thought. Objects 
and events, the materials of thought, must be broken down into smaller units 
and their interrelationships and their relations to the whole must be studied 
before thinking can proceed. This is the method of analysis. The process 
involves more than mere fractionalization. Analysis implies recognition 
of relationships. The procedure is different and the results are different 
when elements are studied separately and when they are studied in rela-
tion to a meaningful whole. It is this difference which has provided the 
setting for the conflict in analytic procedure, and it is this conflict which 
forms the continuity around which any study of the method of analysis must 
be developed. 
The terms "structural" and "functional" differentiate conflicting methods 
of analysis but they do not refer to specific methods of attacking specific 
problems. They are . interpreted as meaning "types" of analytic procedure. 
They define the frame of reference within which analysis is made. Analysis 
made within the structural frame of reference tend to view objects of study 
more or less as independent variables, entities, irrespective of their dependent 
relationships. Analyses made within the functional frame tend to view ob-
jects of study as dependent variable, wholes, respecting dependent or func-
tional relationships. These two concepts have contended for supremacy 
throughout history. Education has not escaped. Its methods, its philosophy, 
its practices have been determined in no small degree by the dominant con-
cept. A study1 was made which attempted to trace the development and 
influence of this conflict in the fields of philosophy, physics, biology, psychol-
ogy, and education. The following implications for education are the re-
sult of this study. 
1 Clugston, Herbert A., His tory of the Conflict Between Structural and Functional 
Types of Analysis in Educational Research. Unpublished doctor's disser tation. Boulder: 
University of Colorado, 1941. 
Note: Although this study was concluded a decade ago the educational implications de.., 
rived from it were prophetic. Current literature in psychology and education indicates 
that practice is becoming progressively more functional. These implications are present-
ed here to encourage those who read them to persist in their efforts to improve educa-
tional practice. 
-5-
A. Methods of Research 
1. Method versus methods 
A method is a way of doing something-a mode of procedure. There is 
no patent or invariable way of doing anything, but, obviously, there are bet-
ter or preferred ways. A preferred method is the most effective way of 
reaching a desired goal or accomplishing a definite task. Effectiveness may 
be determined only by evaluating the results obtained when the method has 
been used. Furthermore, a preferred method is frequently a combination of 
methods. The question may be raised justly whether there is not general 
method which has many aspects rather than numerous specific and distinct 
methods. Here, again, is the conflict of viewpoints. When emphasis is plac-
ed upon structure the elements of research methods stand out and more or 
less discrete methods appear. When emphasis is placed upon function they 
tend to disappear or to become secondary in importance, at least. 
During the growth of the scientific movement there was a tendency 
among writers on research methodology to fractionalize method to a high 
degree and to draw sharp lines of distinction between the resultant methods. 
But, however, classified for purposes of definition, methods must be regard-
ed as continuous, not as discrete when they are being employed. Even the 
highly specialized experimental method is not entirely devoid of the delib-
erative, the integrative, and the analytical, particularly. While this is a 
matter of theoretical rather than practical concern, in the main, it is signifi-
cant insofar as such a point of view constitutes a safe-guard against the 
tendency to curtail results through an attempt to use too limited procedures 
-as has been the case so often when either extreme of the conflict has pre-
vailed. 
Furthermore, good methods grow, they are not created. Method as it 
is found today is the result of the age-long quest of many after truth. The 
methods that survive are, generally speaking, the methods which man has 
found most effective in accomplishing the results desired. In other words, 
the functional value of a method determines its survival and the direction 
of its development. Methods evolve as materials and problems change and 
as goals become more clearly defined. A good method is a flexible procedure 
and not a rigid rule of action, derived and defined a priori. Under the latter, 
/ method would remain static and become increasingly less productive-non-
functional. Under the. former, method grows-evolves-and becomes in-
creasingly more effective of desirable results, more functional. Hence, a 
good research worker will adapt current methods but will be exceedingly 
cautious about adopting any one of them in seeking the solution for a par-
ticular problem. 
2. The value of classification 
Classification is a form of comparison. When objects, events, or pro-
cedures are recognized as possessing common characteristics they are group-
ed into a class and given, the same name. This classification makes for econ-
omy in handling knowledge since systematized knowledge is easier to grasp 
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and retain. Furthermore, the discovery of the marks of identification intro-
duces one to a vast amount of knowledge about the individual members of 
the class which one might otherwise overlook. Each attempt as classification 
or dealing with classifications furnishes a first step toward improvement of 
one's knowledge through the discovery of new facts. Finally, classification 
enables one to generalize about classes, for example, to discover and formu-
late their characteristic ways of acting. The value of these generalized for-
mulas lies in the provision of economical ways for making knowledge more 
secure. It may be well to note here that a generalization is not invalidated 
when an exception is discovered provided there are not too many. Classifi-
cations with their generalizations are not invariable and ultimate, always. 
They do provide organization and systemization upon the basis of which ad-
vancement may be made. 
Classifications of research methods are no exception. There have been 
many attempts to classify them and, frequently, pronounced dogmatism con-
cerning their relative value has dominated educational research. There has 
been a tendency to regard as "sacred" cert~in methods, notably the experi-
mental method, and make all else subservient and secondary thereto. This 
has been accompanied by a tendency to deny certain other methods the right 
to be classified as a research method, particularly the deliberative. Failure 
to sense the unity in research methodology is to blame. There are as many 
arguments available to support the contention that the experimental serves 
the deliberative as the contrary. But when method is regarded as a whole 
with many functional aspects such contention is not necessary. The question 
then becomes, "Is this a useful aspect of method?" rather than, "Is this pro-
cedure entitled to be dignified as a method?" Whether or not analysis, delib-
eration, experiment, and the like constitute valid research methods is less 
important than the discovery of the role these various procedures play in 
research and how they may be improved. On the other hand, the various 
attempts that have been made to classify research methods have been valu-
able in that subjecting procedure repeatedly to rigid analysis and formula-
1ion tends to result in a refinement of available methods. Classification and 
definition of different research methods is not an end but rather a means to 
a more complete understandng of method in general. 
3 Scientific method 
a. What is knowledge 
The goal of all research is knowledge. Knowledge may be classified as 
(1) common-sense knowledge, (2) scientific knowledge, and (3) philosophic 
knowledge. The point must be made emphatically that the difference between 
them is relative rather than absolute. Common-sense knowledge may be 
possessed by any one as a result of simple, non-critical observation. Scien-
tific knowledge is similar but carried to a higher degree of correctness through 
more critical examination. Such knowledge tends to be narrow - specific 
to a particular field of interest. "Science" is a method but "a science" is. an 
organized field of knowledge procured through scientific methods. Each 
science interprets facts and problems largely in the light of its own organiza-
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tion. It has been obserVed that "theoretical" physics, "theoretical" biology, 
and the like have arisen to meet this demand, to make scientific knowledge 
mo::.-e functional. 
Philosophy is a synthesis or correlation of knowledge and experience 
occasioned by the necessity of solving a problem. It is the "master science" 
which unifies the findings of the several sciences, correlating the truths of a 
particular science with the truths of other sciences or the whole body of truth. 
It examines critically the assumptions and hypotheses of the sciences, analyzes 
the principles upon which they are founded, and evaluates their concepts. 
In its criticism of the method and results of the sciences it does not seek to 
amass new facts, as such. It seeks rather to determine the meaning of known 
facts, by "thinking through" all of their implications. Philosophic knowl-
edge, therefore, is scientific knowledge made more meaningful and hence 
more useful through interpretation based on a wider organization and integra-
-tion of knowledge. 
There is no attempt here to deliniate between science and philosophy. 
'The difference between them is relative, a difference in degree rather than 
kind or, perhaps more accurately, a difference in premise. .If the facts that 
have been interpreted according to this wider organization are scientific, that 
.is, accurate, it follows that the resultant knowledge is scientific provided the 
method has been critically accurate. To this method has been given the 
name "deliberative". 
The attitude one has toward the definition of knowledge will condition 
one's attitude toward research methodology. If one accepts the more limit-
ed view that knowledge is a collection of discrete facts, countable and measur-
able exactly, then one must accept the more limited view of method. If one 
believes that there is knowledge which consists not so much in quantitiative 
facts amassed as in qualitative evaluations and interpretations of the facts 
of science and the experience of man, then one must recognize as valid meth-
ods for synthesizing, evaluating, and interpreting these facts more exactly. 
These methods, because of the nature of the data yielded, are called "qualita-
tive" methods, or aspects of method, as distinguished from "quantitiative" 
methods which yield quantitiative data.1 
Every man evaluates and interprets the facts of experience. Common-
sense interpretation--correlation of knowledge and experience-is as preva-
lent as common-sense kJ?.owledge. The process is inevitable. Its soundness 
depends upon the procedure employed. The refinement of qualitative meth-
ods is intended to do for common-sense interpretation, evaluation, and syn-
thesis, in the interest of greater accuracy and dependability, what science has 
done for common-sense knowledge. Hence it is observed that one's concept 
of analysis may govern one's definition of knowledge and one's definition 
of knowledge may, in turn, determine one's attitude toward research method. 
1 Rober t A. Davis (editor), l\fethods of Educational Research (Boulder: University 
of Colorado, 1931, mimeographed.) 
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Structural analysis yields particulate quantities of knowledge as a rule, hence 
the more limited concepts of method, whereas functional analysis permits and 
encourages the broader view, hence the more liberal definition of method. 
b. Is a scientific method possible? 
One great ambition has motivated the endeavors of twentieth century 
educators, namely, the development of a science of education, the methods of 
which should be scientific. Science was conceived in terms of nineteenth 
century biology and developed in conjunction with a growing physiological 
psychology. Educational statistics and objective tests and measurements 
were the result, and experiment became the prinicpal method. All subjectivity 
and all methods that did not adhere to this conception of a science of educa-
tion were discarded. It was an age of atomistic-mechanism predominantly. 
Recently, disillusionment has settled over the educational camp. Science 
and scientific method has not worked the miracles that had been hoped for. 
Educators and psychologists had overlooked certain factors such as; man is 
a whole being and his members and functions cannot be segregated into par-
ticles for rigid analysis and experiment without distorting the truth; man is 
a member of a complex society which is a functioning unit. Physics and 
biology had had the same rude awakening and psychology had been struggling 
with the organismic problem. It is not strange that educators have begun to 
wonder-is a scientific method possible? 
The question cannot be answered completely here, nor can a complete 
reformulation be suggested. The latter is already definitely under way. The 
question should be-what sort of scientific .method is most suited to modern 
needs and conceptions? Method must be scientific if by that is meant ac-
curate, unbiased, complete. It must not be qualified by such narrow and 
limiting conceptions as have prevailed. 
Physics has not discarded scientific method in developing the new quan-
tum theories and probability mathematics. Biology is no less scientific under 
the organismic concepton than it was in the nineteenth century. If such 
drastic steps were deemed necessary in these two established fields then edu-
cators should not feel that scientific method is impossible in the event that 
modern education continues to follow the functional trend. It means rather, 
that qualitative methods will need to be developed further and employed more 
widely and the meaning of the term "scientific method" broadened to include 
them. If this step is not taken then it is conceivable that education must cease 
to be called a science. Scientific method consists not so much in adherence 
to certain specific and unalterable mechanical procedures as in an attitude 
toward truth, a way of regarding problems and theii solution by whatsoever 
means is available and best suited to the demands of the situation. In at-
tempting to be "scientific" education has often been exceedingly "unscien-
tific". 
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C. What is the outlook for experiment 
and statistical procedure? 
Does this mean that education is about to forsake experiment and return 
to uncontrolled observation? Does it mean that statistics and objective meas-
urements will no longer be needed? Not at all. It means, rather, that such 
extensions of these instruments of scientific method must be made as will 
enable them to meet the demands of the newer conceptions of education. 
Under a mechanical philosophy of education in which part processes are re-
garded separately and wholes are conceived as summations, experimental 
procedures tend to be mechanical and artificial. They seek to abstract the 
elements which are to. be studied, and to control or rule out the others. The 
conclusions thus reached often fail to perform as expected in non-experi-
mental situations. The reason is obvious-wholes cannot be so easily dis-
turbed without disturbing their fundamental nature 
It is not necessary to dispense with experiment. It is too valuable as a 
procedure. But, as experimentation with animals yields ground to experi-
mentation with humans, and as laboratory experiments with single variables 
rigidly controlled under artificial conditions are yielding to classroom experi-
ments carried on under conditions as true to life as possible, so the develop-
ment may be expected to lead into broader areas of social experimentation 
where the single variable technique is frequently inappropriate. It may mean 
dispensing with some of the statitistical niceties that have paraded as research 
so often but which have only cloaked the meaningless of the endeavor. Where 
appropriate, controlled experiment employing the single variable, statistically 
treated, will and must continue to be used. The new education for the com-
plex, democratic American way of life cannot be fully investigated if that way 
of life is disrupted. Experiment, therefore, must also be long-time, more 
loosely controlled, more critically observational, and interpreted in terms of 
true-life situations. 
Whereas the results of experiments have most often been expressed in 
statistical terms there is a tendency now to resort to judgments rather than 
such statistical devices as criterion scores. It is doubtful if attempts to treat 
complex situations by means of vectors (Lewin) and topology (Brown) will 
ever be of any great practical value. They accomplish very little that can-
not . be said just as well in plain English. Borrowing from physics concepts 
/ that are useful therein and attempting to force them into a sociaily dynamic 
frame appears not to gain much in understanding. Wearing the cloak of 
science does not make a scientist. Education will not suffer loss of prestige 
by being intensely practical. Experiment and statistics must be made useful 
and practical in the classroom and in society to survive. They cannot sur-
vive by basking in the reflected glory of mechanical and abstract research. 
d. Is there an analytical method? 
Research workers, in . their endeavor to classify research· method; have 
asked whether or not analysis is unique enough to be given place as a method 
of research. This question cannot be answered finally by a simple "yes" or 
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"no". It depends almost entirely upon the stand taken with reference to the 
conceptions discussed earlier in this article and to what degree it is consid-
ered desirable to carry the analysis of method. 
Bluntly; in keeping with that point of view which seeks to reduce the 
basic classifications to as few and as broad categories as possible, the answer 
here is going to be "no". Justification could easily be made for answering 
"yes", on the ground that many problems demand just such a specific pro-
cedure as that which has been called "the method of analysis". The pro-
cedure can be reasonably well patterned and its means for gathering data are 
well developed. However, conceived in this manner, analysis becomes very 
narrow and limited. True analysis permeates all research, all thinking. 
Man analyzes and selects momentarily throughout life. There is also a re-
lationship phase to analysis, and analysis which loses sight of the relations 
between elements or factors is blind. Hence, this more limited definition, 
one which resolves the method into a mere process of fact or datum enum-
eration,, is not adequate enough to warrant granting it a special category. 
The patterns of analysis, as employed around 1928, and as classified by 
Charters, Monroe, Harap, and Rugg can readily be grouped as follows: (1) 
Activity and job analysis, (2) Analysis of child reactions; likes, dislikes, in-
terests, abilities, and the like, (3) Analysis of child andfor adult needs; per-
sonal and social needs (a) as felt by child, (b) as observed by adults, (c) as 
determined by experience; present and future need and (4) Analysis of the 
child's problems as a basis for diagnosis and guidance. This, while dealing 
mainly with conditions essential to .curriculum making, is a fairly representa-
tive list of the types of analysis required in educational investigations. Of 
course, there are untouched areas such as; analysis of physical facilities and 
requirements for building, analyses essential to wise budgeting, and the like. 
In fact, analysis is necessary before most projects are undertaken. The steps 
usually are: (1) Determine what facts are needed; (2) Determine the best 
sources available from which these facts can be secured_:._sources may be 
direct or secondary; (3) Determine the best procedure for securing the facts 
from these sources-the technique most suited to data required; (4) The 
analysis; securing the facts-requires "breaking down" the sources to find 
the desired facts; (5) Assemble and classify the facts. Such analysis ends 
when this last step is taken. 
Analysis which is blind counting is practically worthless. The elements, 
whatever their nature, bear some relation to the whole and to each other. 
Taking note of these relationships is vital to the significance of the derived 
information. One's attitude toward the whole will influence one's attitude 
toward the meaning of the parts and their relationships. Hence, analysis must 
not be purely structural in character. But, functional analysis is carried 
on within a definite frame of reference and its data are relative. This means 
that it is descriptive of conditions within that reference frame. 
It would appear from the foregoing that analysis is, in reality, a phase 
of description. Even counting in order to determine content, as in textbook 
analysis, has a descriptive quality, at least implied; it is an attempt to describe 
content. On the other hand, a survey which employs standard tests to arrive 
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at a description of the schools in a community is partially analytic. So, to 
classify analysis under the descriptive method is not inconsistent, but to in-
sist that analysis stand alone could tend to limit its more complete function-
ing as well as emphasize its mechanical features. Present-day tendencies do 
not encourage too complete abstractions. The frame of reference must be 
retained to protect the meaningfulness of the abstracted elements, whether 
techniques or knowledges. The more functional analysis becomes the more 
descriptive it is and hence the more justification there is for its being classi-
fied. Purely structural analysis scarcely warrants the dignity of a special 
category of its own. It is, rather, a technique for gathering data. 
4. The outlook for research 
Research in education is here to stay provided it can justify its cost in 
time, effort, and money. To do so it must produce results in actual school 
situations. It is not enough to refine methods of collecting data that cannot 
readily be translated into improvements in the practical affairs of education. 
One of the criticisms leveled at research is just this lack of capacity to pro-
duce needed functional changes. The reason is that research methods are too 
c;.bstract, too artificial, too mechanical. 
There is a difference between "scientism" and "scientific method". Re-
s~arch workers have only too often become so engrossed in the fine points 
of their procedures, almost to the point of fanaticism, that they have become 
worshippers of the means and have lost sight of the ends. That is scientism. 
The true scientific spirit is an attitude of mind, a way of life. It is bound to 
no specific procedures or devices. It employs whatever method accomplish-
es most accurately, most economically, most efficiently the task at hand. This 
is scientific method. The more limited view of science as applied to educa-
tional research must yield to the broader view or research will be cast out 
as cluttering the pathway of progress. Those methods will survive that meet 
the criterion of functional value. 
B. The Philosophy of Education 
1. The philosophical heritage of the present century 
Study has shown that the interrelationships of many factors and many 
areas of knowledge have. influenced the trend of educational development. 
This is true because life is not partitioned. It is one fluid, continuous stream 
of events. But, in the course of development, areas of knowledge have been 
particularized for the sake of efficiency in comprehending and handling them. 
Events and facts have been abstracted out of these areas for the same reason, 
and so on until the fractionalization process has reached the minutest ele-
ments. These elements have been elevated to first rank importance and 
original unity has been forgotten. This was the status of scientific and 
philosophic knowledge when the nineteenth century ended. 
Educational philosophy reflects current patterns of thought, hence the 
c!ominant pattern to which the twentieth century fell heir was predominantly 
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structural. The philosophy and psychology of James and Dewey fell upon 
unreceptive minds, which were incapable of understanding it until the pat-
tern had shifted in keeping with the general flow of reflective events. What 
was the pattern of philosophical thinking in education? 
a. Erudition-knowledge for 
knowledge's sake 
The mark of an educated man for centuries had been the quantity of 
his knowledge. Because the common man had so little need or opportunity 
for securing knowledge he looked with awe upon the man who knew. Par-
ents who could afford it sent their children to school so that they too might 
become erudite. It mattered little for what this knowledge might be usefUl 
One goal for education which still had great force at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was erudition-knowledge for the sake of knowledge. 
b. Mental discipline-the 
training of the mind 
Faculty psychology had been a source of contention in the nineteenth 
century but its hold could not be broken entirely. Even after it became evi-
dent that mind was not a composite of unrelated faculties, the idea that the 
mind could be trained through vigorous exercise tould not be shaken. This 
idea still persists, often unwittingly, in educational circles today. Require-
ments for degrees are advocated frequently on the ground of their disciplin-
ary value. 
Teachers, swayed by this philosophy, employed materials and methods 
best suited to such exercise. Curriculum makers determined content and 
organization by the criterion of the development of a strong and sturdy in-
tellect. Certainly, this philosophy was functional within its narrow refer-
ence frame even though only the strong survived and, in the light of modern 
psychology, it was fundamentally unsound. In the broadest sense, as learn-
ing is now understood, it was a grossly structural philosophy. Nevertheless, 
one of the goals of education forty to fifty years ago was mental discipline-
the training of the mind. 
c. Preparation for adult life 
and for college entrance 
The child had not yet come into his rights. He was still very much mis-
understood. Child nature had only begun to challenge psychological investi-
gators. Rosseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel had made a beginning from a 
philosophical and human interest point of view. Unfortunately, child psy-
chology was born in an era of structural, physiological emphasis in psychology. 
The child became an object of study rather than a subject of concern. He 
was regarded as a synthetic creature rather than as a dynamic organism with 
feeling, thinking, and behavior peculiar to his stage of physical, emotional, 
and intellectual development. 
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Content and method were selected and developed, not with reference to 
existing functional needs, interests, and abilities of the child but with refer-
ence to what he would be when he grew up. The child was regarded as a 
miniature adult. This was the pattern for all children. For the few who 
survived the ordeal and whose parents could afford it and who desired to 
continue into the secondary school, preparation for college entrance became 
a dominating factor in their education. The question of appropriateness of 
curriculum content and methods to adolescent nature did not concern late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century educators. In fact, even now, that 
concern is just beginning to be given serious consideration by adminiStrators 
and secondary school teachers. A third goal of early twentieth century 
education was preparation for adult life for all and preparation for college 
entrance for the few. 
2. EdUICa:tion is lif~the child is a growing, 
dynamic, goal-seeking organism 
The challenge of Dewey's philosophy was one of the principal factors in 
changing the course of the development of twentieth century educational 
philosophy. The philosophy which: Dewey advocated was a resurgent expres-
sion of the philosophy of wholeness and dynamic development, the philosophy 
of change. He was the chief exponent in psychology and education rather 
than the sole originator of the modern expression of that philosophy. Here-
flected the restlessness of the more resourceful thinkers in all fields of 
knowledge under the static influence of an atomistic-mechanistic conception 
of life. 
Physics and biology had broken ground and the rather latent nineteenth 
century philosophy was beginning to be aroused by a new challenge. The 
increasing complexity of life, the expanding horizon of knowledge, the de:.. 
veloping accuracy of available instruments and experimental techniques were 
fast rendering the static approach untenable. Psychology was soon to fial.1 
in line. Structural psychology gradually, however, reluctantly, is yielding 
to functional psychology in its broader definition. Organismic concepts are 
rapidly replacing structural concepts. The child can no longer be regarded 
as as assembly of parts and part processes. The child is coming to be re-
garded as a growing, dynamic, goal-seeking organism with abilities, interests, 
needs, and dispositions peculiar to his stage of development and circum-
stances of life. Educatio:p. is coming to be regarded as synonymous with life. 
It is living as well as preparation for living. 
3. A social philosophy of education 
The uniqueness of the American way of life has been dawning upon 
modern educators more, perhaps, than at any other stage in its development. 
Complex social interrelationships demand a higher type of citizenship. Chal-
lenges from totalitarian nations have caused Americans to reevaluate their 
democracy. They are more sure than ever that the democratic way of life is 
the only satisfactory solution for the problem of a complex society. They are 
certain that education in a democracy has an inescapable role to play in 




Psychology has pointed repeatedly toward the problem of individu~ dif-
ferences. Whether they are innate or cultural in origin matters little; they 
are probably both. In a democracy, they represent a challenge arid a respon-
sibility for education. Equality of opportunity in keeping with the individual's 
abilities and dispositions is the ideal. And it is the individual as a citizen 
which concerns education most in this connection. Education has a social 
aspect, a social responsibility, as well as an individual one. Education is and 
must be centered' in the life of the child but it must also be centered in the 
needs of the society which fosters and protects that child. So modern edu-
cation must have a social philosophy as well as an individual philosophy. 
4. The outlook for a philosophy of education 
The future development of educational philosophy will be contingent upon 
the outcome oi present chaotic world conditions. If the democracies prevail 
there will, without doubt, be a continuation of present trends-the blending 
and further development of both individual and social goals and a more com-
plete functionalization of the educational program. Totalitarian methods 
must, of necessity, be static and mechanical. Free growth and natural change 
are inimical to dictated social control. Democratic mehods, when given full, 
intelligent expression, are favorable to functional, dynamic growth and devel-
opment. Functionalism is both an outgrowth of and a contributor to the 
devolopment of a democratic way of life. It flourishes best in an atmosphere 
of socialized, democratic freedom. 
The sciences, including psychology, appear destined to continue their 
functional development. The increasing demands of practical necessity will 
keep them, for some time to come, from lapsing back into their purely aca-
demic self-complacency. And, now that ~e artificial barriers separating 
science and philosophy are disappearing the development of the theoretical 
aspects of the sciences, as well as their more technical aspects, will continue. 
~ucational philosophy cannot help but reflect this newer aspect of scientific 
development. Hence, it may well be anticipated that the philosophy of edu-
cation will assume an even more important role than formerly in the progres-
sive integration of the structural and functional points of view in education. 
C. The Curriculum 
1. The aims of education as expressed in the curriculum 
The goals of education, as reviewed in the discussion of the philosophy 
of education, become a very practical problem in curriculum making. Under 
the so-called traditional point of view they were not difficult to attain in and 
through the curriculum. As they have developed in recent years, curdculum 
making has become a much more difficult undertaking. Knowledge is still 
an important outcome of education; intellectual efficiency must be developed 
through the acquisition of appropriate techniques; there are still the mature 
stages of life to prepare for; but these traditional aims take on a radically dif-
ferent meaning under the functional approach. In addition individual and 
social development' must be provided. for: · · · · 
Aims must be general enough to apply at all levels with all groups in all 
areas. They must possess that quality of universality which will enable them 
to function in keeping with the organismic conception and a social philosophy 
of life. Endless fractionalization of aims to meet every possible situation 
appears to be unnecessary and even dangerous, in that it often leads to con-
fusion or routine mechanization in teaching. 
There will be, of course, certain special or particular aims reflecting the 
needs, interests, abilities, and the life, of children arrived at by means of a 
careful analysis carried on within a frame of reference that recognizes the 
whole child as a social being. 
2. The organization of the curriculum 
The curriculum must be organized as a flexible unit. It must be flexible 
to meet the demands of individual differences and a dynamic growth concept. 
It must be a unit to preserve the wholeness of the experiences of life. 
Subjects and subject matter have been the center of controversy for 
some time. The traditional organization of the materials of learning into 
subjects has been challenged on the ground that it was unnatural, tending to 
break experience down into small, unrelated segments, losing sight of the 
unity of experience. Attempts have been made to organize curriculums on 
an entirely different basis. Subject matter was not to be taught as such 
but was to be brought in incidentally in the study of some area of living, theme, 
life function, or the like. This question has not been settled at present. The 
tendency appears to favor retention of subjects, not as the sole or even the 
chief basis of organization, but in order to preserve their value. Subject 
matter should be used as a means rather than as an end in itself. The tenden-
cy to depend upon textbooks alone has yielded to the employment of a 
variety o£ techniques and materials most intimately related to the childhood 
experience. 
The functional approach to curriculum organization appears to be gain-
ing a firmer hold at present. Agreement has not been reached concerning 
the exact nature of the organization but there is considerable talk about 
"units". According to Harap, "The unit of learning appears to be a com-
plete and coherent learning experience having a purpose which is meaningful 
to the pupil, accepted as his own, and which is closely related to a life situa-
tion."1 Not all will go so far as to say with Harap that the basis of the unit 
/ is experience rather than subjects but the tendency is to favor some form 
of unit organization which will retain the essential unity of experience. What-
ever the conclusion reached may be it is safe to predict that traditional, piece-
meal learning of isolated facts in a carefully and rigidly partitioned school 
day will disappear. Furthermore, it is safe to predict that "subjects" will not 
be lost entirely although their importance may be greatly diminished. Or-
ganization will be determined largely with reference to the functional unity 
of the experiences of life. 
1 Harap, Henry (Chairman) - The Changing Curriculum. (New York - D. Appleton 
- Century Co., 1931), P. 77. 
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3. Method 
The twentieth century inherited a structural conception of the process 
of learning and its concomitant routine, mechanical method of teaching. As-
sociational psychology, learning by connections, stimulus-response bonds, re-
flexes and conditioning were some of the concepts which characterized psy-
chological thinking and formed the basis of method. To say the least, method, 
so conceived, was highly mechanical and non-functional with respect , to ex-
perience regarded as a unit. Method was largely a matter of routine, reci-
tation, drill, memorization, "stamping in" through frequency, recency, and 
so forth. The element of purpose was lacking in learning. Functional psy-
chology and the concept of organism demands that learning be regarded as a 
continuous stream of more or less purposeful activity . in which meaningful 
situations replace isolated stimuli. Reflexes become pure abstractions and 
cannot be the basis for learning, and conditioning is but one aspect of a com-
plex process. The organism as a whole responds to purposeful situations, 
and specific responses are emergents from original mass reaction, aimed at 
relieving the tension aroused by the demands of the situation. It is clear 
that a mechanical theory of learning does not explain such dynamic experi-
ences. 
Method involves socialized activity, planned experience, problem-solving, 
and reflective thinking in meaningful situations. The teacher no longer domi-
nates a passive learner who gropes his way, blindly, through a meaningless 
mass of isolated facts. The teacher is a guide who watches over the learner, 
advising, suggesting, encouraging his self-activity in a situation reflecting true-
to-life experiences framed in terms of the child's understanding, needs, and 
interests. The child is constantly aware of his relation to the materials of 
learning because they have meaning for him. Method has, as its goal, learn-
ing that will function in the life of the child now and in the future, as an 
individual and as a member of a democratic society. 
The question naturally arises-Is there not danger of going too far? 
There always is. Extremes are dangerous. In certain quarters tradition-
phobia appears to be a greater threat to the success of education than the 
tradition-bound curriculum ever was. Moderation is always the mark of 
true progress. Traditional structural-physiological· psychology was not all 
wrong and methods growing out of it were not all bad. Many of them were, 
and still are, effective. For example, there has been a strong reaction against 
drill. True, drill is mechanical in nature. But drill is effective, particularly 
when that drill has meaning. Drill can be functionalized, can be made pur-
poseful. It need not be blind, automatic repetition, in fact, it must not be, 
if it is to be of value in learning. ' I 
Memorization has come in for its share of criticism. Rote learning of 
factual material is avoided entirely in many modern schools. Learning of this 
type is certainly non-functional iri the brqadest sense, and should not be a 
major schoolroom procedure. But, tot~ leatni g 1 is 1often the most effective 
means available for mastering certain materials. Pupils should understand 
that true-to-life conditions contain many distasteful but necessary experienc-
es. The football teams would rathe1· scrimmage than drill on fundamentals 
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or memorize plays and signals. Certainly, no coach would depend upon drill 
and rote learning alone to develop a team; neither does a successful coach 
minimize their value. But scrimmage, fundam~ntals, plays, signals, and 
rules are all essential aspects of good coaching. Some "progressive" teachers 
would fail dismally if they employed their classroom methods as coaches. 
Perhaps they are failing dismally, if the full truth were known. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that when structural, mechanical methods are in-
dicated, they should be employed; when functional, dynamic methods are in-
dicated, they should be used. The two approaches are not irreconcilably in-
compatible. Through all, there must be meaning and understanding rather 
than blind obedience, willingness rather than compulsion. In the final analy-
sis, the method is often less important than the spirit in which learner and 
teacher employ it. 
The study throws very little light upon learning by parts or by wholes. 
One could become highly enthusiastic over the concept of wholeness and 
berate fractionalization of the materials of learning as belonging to the era 
of atomistic-mechanism. But even a cake must be cut before it is eaten. It 
would be utterly foolish to cast off learning by parts. The important consid-
eration is that the learner should understand the interrelationship of the parts 
and their function in the whole, to the extent that such is possible without 
breaking down the whole, before he concentrates upon learning by parts. The 
danger in part learning is that the learner will fail to sense the functional 
unity of the whole. The danger in whole learning is that the learner will 
have a superficial regard for the whole. Whether or not the one or the other 
should be used will depend upon the learner, the demands of the learning 
situation, and the nature of the materials of learning. Certainly, there can 
be nothing inconsistent between a fractionalized school situation and learning 
by parts when the proper perspective is maintained. 
Motivation, as conceived in a functional curriculum, does not consist of 
such detached and isolated devices as have been employed so commonly in 
the classroom. Motives, such as teacher fear, school marks, and the like, 
are extrinsic to the learner. They do not enter into and form a part of any 
self-initiated plan of action. Learning thus motivated lacks the quality of 
purpose. It fails to result in any broadly functional behavior. Such a re-
striction in viewpoint is the result of the teacher's failure to consider the total 
picture. She has been too much concerned with attaining a limited, specific 
objective. Public criticism of the work of the school charges that it does not 
carry over into life. The functional curriculum has been attempting to meet 
this challenge, in part, by brr adening the concept of motivation. A motive is 
established in consonance, with an existing or created interest, need, or de-
sire of the child. The child assists in determining a plan of action to reach 
that goal and satisfy the motive. Together, the motive and the plan consti-
tute the child's purpose since either, without the other, lacks purpose. Pur-
poseful behavior has meaning and meaning insures a higher degree of re-
tention and application of fhe results lofi learning. It is clear that motivation, 
applied from without, limited in significance, and devoid of a plan of action, 
must be regarded as, non-functional except in a very restricted and often 
harmful manner. > • 
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This section on method has attempted to show briefly how the shifting 
conflict between structural and functional attitudes is influencing classroom 
teaching. The functional attitude is confronting teachers and educational 
psychologists with a very practical problem-how to functionalize method 
and still maintain thoroughness of instruction, adequate evaluation, disci-
plined behavior, and so forth. The final answer to this problem has not been 
given. 
D. General Conclusions 
1. There has been a cyclical conflict throughout the history of human 
thought between structural and functional types of analysis, a tendency to 
premise thinking on structural elements as primary as opposed to wholes as 
primary with elements as derivatives. 
2. The cycles have been narrowing in recent centuries and a tendency 
appears destined, at the present time, to bring the two into closer h.annony 
as realization of the nature of the conflict becomes more apparent. 
3. The prevalence of the one or the other extreme has tended to 
dominate philosophical and scientific thinking and to result in attitudes and 
practices compatible therewith. The structural type results generally in 
static, atomistic, and mechanistic ways of thinking and acting whereas the 
functional type results in dynamic, unitary, and meaningful patterns. Both 
have their valuable contributions to make. The important consideration is 
awareness of the dominant pattern and evaluation of the results of thinking 
accordingly. 
4. Research methods have been particularly responsive to the dominant 
pattern. Controlled experiment employing the single variable technique, 
statistical devices, and objective measurements, prevail under the structural 
attitude. Failing to realize the nature of their reference system, investiga-
tors have tended to generalize too freely from abstract data. Furthermore, 
the data so derived are not always true to fact. There is a greater tendency, 
when functional attitudes prevail, to emphasize the more qualitative aspects 
of knowledge, but also a tendency toward superficiality. Research needs to 
consider carefully the consequences of the two attitudes. 
5. The "method of analysis" is scarcely broad enough to warrant a 
separate category in research methodology. It is more properly regarded 
as a technique for gathering data pursuant to a descriptive study. "Analysis" 
as generally employed has a definitely descriptive connotation. 
6. There is a fundamental difference between "scientific method" and 
"scientism". Educational investigation, following the structural attitude, has 
tended toward a narrow, limited scientism. Results have suffered propor-
tionately, many of which, if not most of which still control psychological 
thinking as applied to education. It is difficult to shake the confidence 
that has been placed in the results of abstract experimentation; e.g., many 
isolated drives, determined by controlled experiments with children and ani-
mals under artificial conditions, are supposed to set up tensions which re-
l>Ultant activity seeks to remove. When the organism is viewed as a whole 
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under ·nonnal · conditions such explanation appears- to be open to, question. 
Scientific method, on the other hand, is an attitude toward truth and its de-
rivation; It is not bound by restricted procedure but demands accuracy and 
completeness, broadly conceived. 
7. The philosophy of education is determined by prevailing thought 
patterns. Structuralism tends to result in a limited and limiting philosophy 
whereas functionalism tends to broaden the scope and liberalize the program 
of education. The former emphasizes subjects and subject matter, formally 
presented, whereas the latter recognizes the child and society as central 
with the materials of learning as means to an end. With the former, the 
child tends to be regarded as a synthesis of parts and part processes and as a 
more or less passive recipient of learning. With the latter, the child becomes 
a dynamic, growing, developing, socialized, goal-seeking organism. 
8. All phases of education are influenced in like manner by the preva-
lence of structural or functional concepts. Curriculum development cannot 
be understood apart from its relation to the prevailing patterns of thought. 
Administrative and organizational principles and practices could be shown to 
have been determined largely by the same concepts. It appears that the 
statement "As goes analysis, so goes education"-may not be too extreme. 
9. It is recommended that more careful attention be given to the frame 
of reference in which educational investigations are made. Many of the er-
rors of the twentieth century could have been avoided had such insight been 
available. Education cannot longer claim to be truly scientific if it closes its 




Abstract of the Original Study 
History of the Conflict Between Structural and Funtional 
Types of Analysis in Educational Research 
Analysis forms an integral part of any complete act of thought. Objects 
and events, the materials of though, must be broken down into smaller units 
and their interrelationships and their relations to the whole must be studied 
before thinking can proceed. This is the method of analysis. The process in-
volves more than mere fractionalization. Analysis implies recognition of re-
lationships. The procedure is different and the results are different when 
elements are studied separately and when they are studied in relation to a 
meaningful whole. It is this difference which has provided the setting for 
the conflict in analytic procedure, and it is this conflict which forms the con-
tinuity around which this study of the method of analysis has been developed. 
The terms "structural" and "functional" do not refer to specific methods 
of attacking specific problems. They are intepreted as meaning "types" of 
analytic procedure. They define the frame of reference within which analy-
sis is made. Analyses carried on within the structural frame of reference 
tend to view objects of study more or less as. independent variables, entities, 
irrespective of their dependent relationships. Analyses carried on within the 
functional frame tend to view objects of study as dependent variables, wholes, 
respecting dependent or functional relationships. These two concepts have 
contended for supremacy throughout history. Education has not escaped. 
Its methods, its philosophy, its practices have been determined in no small 
degree by the dominant concept. This study has attempted to trace the de-
velopment and influence of this conflict in philosophy, physics, biology, psy-
chology, and education, particularly curriculum development. 
Research methods are not created; they evolve. They reflect the philoso-
phic attitudes and scientific principles which have been developed in many 
different fields of knowledge and which experience has been found valuable. 
Research workers do well to investigate the origin and development of their 
methods. They may thus escape the incongruities often arising from their 
use under changed conditions. The method of analysis is no exception. 
When conditions change the reference frame of analysis should change. It 
should evolve with the changes in situations requiring analysis. The history 
of philosophic and scientific thinking indicates that there has been a more or 
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The conflict has been evident throughout the history of philosophic 
thought. Materialism, interspersed with bits of idealism, prevailed in early 
Greece. Concepts of change and changelessness, Becoming and Being, had 
brought Heraclitans and Eleatics into conflict. The controversy had been set 
between the unity of the world order, wholes as primal, and the plurality of 
things, parts as primal. The fundamental distinction had been made be-
tween quantiative and qualitative differences, and the postulate that all quali-
tative differences can be dealt with quantitatively had been formulated. The 
basic principles of the whole controversy had been established early and it 
remained only for the future to refine, reformulate, and revise them. The 
pattern which predominated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and which influenced the development of modern science and education was 
the atomistic-mechanism of Galileo and Newton. Physics and biology were 
influenced in their attitudes toward parts and wholes, hence in their attitudes 
toward analysis. Classical physics, based on Newton's mechanical principles 
and emphasizing the particulate nature of matter, detailed analysis, and experi-
mentation with small segments of phenomena, was universally accepted at the 
close of the nineteenth century. Electro-magnetism and the field theory, the 
theory of co-ordinate systems, Planck's quantum theory, and Heisenberg's 
principle of uncertainty challenged its security. The trend in the twentieth 
century has been away from mechanical concepts of objects existing in space 
to measures of their. functions, away from absolutism to relativity, and 
away from determinism to indeterminism. Typical nineteenth century biolo-
gists employed the mechanical explanation. The various fields of biology, in-
cluding physiology, dealt with parts in isolation. Thorough-going abstraction, 
however limiting to understanding, appeared to be essential to comprenhen-
sion. This tendency to forget the organism as a whole was challenged by 
emergent evolution and holistic explanations. More. recent data from the 
fields of physiology and neurology demonstrates the emergent nature of be-
havior patterns as well as neural structures. Apparently, analysis which 
fails to consider the whole organism canpot meet the problems of modern 
biology. 
The roots of modern psychology lie in English empirical psychology which 
tended toward structuralism, and German rational psychology which tended 
toward functionalism. American psychology fell heir, in its late nineteenth 
century development; to physiological psychology with its experimental analy-
sis and laboratory procedure. Mental contents were regarded elementally. 
The genetic method gave rise to analytical and dissective child study. In-
dividual psychology developed in keeping with the trend toward structuralism 
and detailed analysis. Functional psychology was opposed to structural psy-
chology, the former emphasizing operations and the latter content; the former 
seeking to discover what the mind does and the latter seeking to discover 
what the mind is. Gestalt and organismic psychology developed as reactions 
against structuralism, requiring a different type of analysis, one not neglect-
ing the unity of cerebral process. Spearman recently declared that psychol-
ogy must not be a one-sided discipline. It needs to be both descriptive, 
structural, and explanatory, functional. 
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The history of philosophical and scientific concept development clearly 
indicates that there has been a conflict between phenomena regarded as or-
iginally constituted wholes and phenomena regarded as particulate, assembl-
ing themselves by synthetic processes into integrated wholes. The prevail-
ing concept has influenced the method of analysis. · Its development has had 
a cyclical tendency, fluctuating between description and explanation. Knowl-
edge of this tendency and of the nature and implications of the methods in-
volved, should enable educational research workers to evaluate their own 
analyses more accurately. 
The increasing complexity of life during the past seventy-five years has 
resulted in a concomitant increase in the complexity of educational problems. 
Educational research replaced non-critical methods of personal judgment 
with objective, standardized measurements, following the mechanical prin-
ciples of scientific method. Analysis dealt with events in abstraction under 
highly controlled conditions. Experimentation isolated the factors to be 
studied, creating artificial conditions. The gap between research data and 
actual school and life situations widened. It has become apparent that edu-
cational research methods must recognize the interdependence of human re-
lationships and that functional types of analysis must supplement the struc-
tural. 
Curriculum development has been particularly influenced by current con-
cepts of analysis. The curriculum of fifty years ago reflected the structural 
concepts prevalent in science and psychology. Content was particulate sub-
ject matter; method was disciplinary and formal; organization was logical 
rather than psychological; administration was authoritarian. There was small 
regard for child nature and society needs. The complexity of twentieth cen-
tury educational problems required more critical investigations. An era of 
rigidly scientific research, counting and tabulating and experimentation 
under highly controlled conditions, attempted to study the curriculum in the 
light of the needs of children and society. Such exacting methods frequently 
overlooked the true nature of children and of democratic society. A counter-
movement was in progress, claiming to center in the child as a growing, dy-
namic organism. Its advocates denied the possibility of understanding the 
child apart from his total being and proposed a curriculum of experience 
rather than subjects, the methods of which should be real, life activities. It 
reacted so far as to look with suspicion upon all conventional scientific analy-
sis. The research group, attempting to be functional was limited by struc-
tural concepts of method. The "progressive" group's functionalism was fre-
quently superficial by reason of its lack of objective evidence. Both struc-
tural and functional concepts appear to be essential to complete research 
and to adequate curriculum development. At no point has this been forced 
upon the attention of educators more than in the problem created by the 
presence of non-academic, non-college-going youth in secondary schools. 
The last decade of curriculum development has been a period of transition. 
Static methods based on mechanical principles are being modified to produce 
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the emphasis in curriculum development is highly functional. The conclusion 
drawn from the history of the conflict between structural and functional 
types of analysis is that educators will accomplish more enduring results 
through critically objective investigations carried on within a frame of 
reference which does not lose sight of the whole and the interdependence of 
its parts. 
